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Summary  findings
Laeven calculates gross safety net subsidies for a large  findings suggest that the moral hazard behavior of a bank
sample of banks in 12 countries to assess the relationship  depends on its institutional environment and its
between the risk-taking behavior of banks and certain  corporate governance structure.
bank characteristics. He finds that gross safety net  Laeven also presents a matrix that shows estimates of
subsidies are higher for banks that have concentrated  safety net subsidies for a range of given combinations of
ownership, that are affiliated with a business group, that  equity volatilities and equity-to-deposit ratios. These
are small, or that have high credit growth, and for banks  figures could be used as input to an early warning system
in countries with low GDP per capita, high inflation, or  for both individual and systemic banking problems.
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Banking crises have not only shown that banks often take excessive risks, but that risk
taking differs across banks. Some banks engage in more risks than their capital can bear
in case the downside potential of the risks fully materializes, in which case these banks
need to be intervened or even closed down. Others are more prudent and would be able to
weather a banking crisis. It is not well known whether different types of banks take
different risks. In  this  study, we will  analyze a large  sample of  banks  in  different
countries to see whether there is a relationship between bank characteristics such as its
ownership structure and its risk-taking behavior. We measure the degree of risk-taking by
the size of the gross subsidy that has been extended to the bank by the safety net. This so-
called implicit gross safety net subsidy is calculated by applying a well-known technique
that models deposit insurance as a put option on the bank's assets.
We find empirical support of our method to assess the risks of a bank. Gross safety
net subsidies are higher for banks in crisis countries and have some power in predicting
bank distress. We also find for countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes that
deposit insurance has been underpriced on average for the sarnple period of 1991-98. In
other words, banks have been subsidized by governments. We find that gross subsidies
are  higher  for  banks  with  concentrated  ownership,  especially  for  banks  that  are
predominantly owned by a single company, another financial institution, and to a lesser
extent by a single family or individual. Banks with dispersed ownership, on the other
hand, are found to engage into a relatively low degree of risk-taking, as measured by the
level of gross safety net subsidy. We also find that gross safety net subsidies are higher
for banks that are affiliated to a business group, that are small and/or have high credit
growth, and for banks in countries with low GDP per capita, high inflation rates, poor
quality and enforcement of the legal systems, low bank concentration, and/or low foreign
bank penetration. Section 1 reviews the relevant literature of deposit insurance. Section 2
presents the methodology we  apply to  calculate gross  safety net subsidies. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of our calculated gross safety
net subsidies. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
21. Literature
Many countries have implemented deposit insurance schemes to  provide liquidity to
banks in case of bank runs and to prevent bank runs from happening. In most countries
that have explicit deposit insurance schemes, deposits are only insured up to a certain
limit, so-called partial deposit insurance. In some countries, such as Turkey, deposits are
insured in full, so-called complete deposit insurance. The advantage of complete deposit
insurance is that bank runs are fully eliminated. On the other hand, complete deposit
insurance destroys all potentially beneficial information production and monitoring by
depositors. Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998) show that partial governmental deposit
insurance encourages market discipline through bank monitoring by informed depositors,
and that regulatory measures such as limited regulatory forbearance and  tough bank
closure rules  may  control bank  risk taking.  They  argue that  underlying  the partial
insurance conclusion is  the  presumption that  informed depositors  - with  their  own
endowments at risk - will monitor banks better than governmental regulators do.
Demirguic-Kunt  and Huizinga (1999) find empirical evidence that the adoption of
an explicit deposit scheme involves a trade-off between increased depositor safety and
reduced  market  discipline on  banks  by  their  creditors,  while  Demirgiiu-Kunt and
Detragiache (1999) provide empirical evidence using a large sample of countries that
explicit deposit insurance increases banking system vulnerability in countries with weak
institutional environments.
Since Merton (1977), deposit insurance has typically been modeled in the literature
as  a put  option on  the bank's  assets. Marcus  and  Shaked  (1984) were  the  first  to
implement Merton's  (1977) model and test the issue of over/underpricing of insurance
premium empirically. Romn and Verma (1986) claim that Marcus and Shaked (1984)
incorrectly look at the pre-insurance value of bank assets. They design a model that looks
at the post-insurance value of bank assets and that incorporates capital forbearance by the
bank regulators.
Duan (1994) develops a maximum likelihood framework to estimate the value of
the deposit insurance. The approach in Duan (1994) has been improved by Duan and Yu
(1999)  who  employ  the  recently  developed  GARCH  option  pricing  technique  in
determining the deposit insurance value instead of the Black and Scholes (1973) option
3pricing framework. Empirical  studies have demonstrated that  financial asset  returns
exhibit many robust features such as fat-tailed return distributions that are incompatible
with the Black and Scholes (1973) model. The GARCH option pricing model has been
found to outperform its Black and Scholes (1973) counterpart.
The above methods have been applied in a number of empirical studies. Few of
those  studies, however,  look at developing countries. Duan and Yu  (1994) calculate
insurance premiums for ten listed depository institutions in Taiwan for 1985-1992. They
use  Duan's  (1994)  maximum  likelihood estimation  method  to  assess  fair  deposit
insurance  premiums.  Their  findings  indicate  that  these  institutions  were  heavily
subsidized by the deposit insuring agency except in 1989. Duan and Yu (1994) also use
Ronn and Verma's  (1986) method and find significantly different estimates than with
Duan's  (1994) method. Fries, Mason and Perraudin (1993) employ Ronn and Verma's
(1986) method on 16 banks in Japan for the period 1975-1992. They find that Japanese
institutions were  heavily  subsidized by  the  deposit insuring  agency.  Kaplan (1998)
applies Duan's  (1994) method to calculate risk-adjusted deposit premiums for 15 Thai
banks during 1992-97. Kaplan (1998) interprets deposit insurance as a contributing factor
to banking crises. Deposit insurance, as a government guarantee to the banking system,
acts as a subsidy to banks. As banks try to increases this subsidy by growing rapidly and
undertaking riskier lending, they create conditions that make banking crises more likely.
Kaplan finds that Thai commercial banks had been receiving large subsidies even prior to
the crisis. Moreover, those banks with the highest insurance subsidies were the banks that
were nationalized, closed, intervened, or sold to foreigners in 1998.
We will follow Kaplan (1998) by claiming that the level of the gross safety net
subsidy extended to the bank is a measure of the risk-taking of that particular bank. We
will  estimate the gross  safety net  subsidies by  calculating the risk-adjusted  deposit
insurance premiums that banks should have been paying under a risk-adjusted deposit
insurance scheme giving their amount of risk-taking. Since no  country actually has
implemented a market-based risk-adjusted deposit insurance scheme 2, the risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premium will be a fictitious premium.
2 Although  countries  with  an explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  have  mostly  designed  flat rate  deposit
insurance  schemes,  a number  of countries  do  have  small  variations  in deposit  insurance  premia  that  are
intended  to reflect  differences  in risk. Such  differential  systems  are,  however,  not market-based.
4In fact, Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) show that it is impossible to implement a
risk-sensitive deposit insurance pricing scheme that is incentive compatible unless banks
are permitted access to rents,  either through explicit regulatory  subsidies or through
restricted entry into banking.
In countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme, the difference between the
gross safety net subsidy and the deposit insurance premiums that the banks actually pay
to the deposit insurance fund is essentially the net subsidy extended to the bank by the
safety net of the country. Deposit insurance would be underpriced if the net subsidy is
positive. Since we are not specifically interested in the issue of over- or underpricing of
deposit insurance, but merely in estimating overall banking risks we will focus on the
level of gross subsidies.
2. Methodology
In this section we will describe Merton's  (1977) model of deposit insurance that can be
used to calculate implicit safety net subsidies, and the implementations of the model by
Ronn and Verma (1986) and Duan (1994). We then describe  our preferred method.
Consider a firm with assets $ V that issues a single homogeneous debt and promises to
pay $B at maturity date T. Merton (1977) shows the impact of a third-party guarantee of
the payment to the bondholders where there is no uncertainty about the obligation of the
guarantee being met. At maturity date, the value of the firm's equity is the same with or
without third-party guarantee, namnely  max(O, V  - B); the value of the debt is always B;
and the value of the guarantor's claim is min(O, V-  B). In effect, the guarantee creates an
additional cash inflow to the firm of -min(O, V - B) dollars, which can be rewritten as
max(O,  B - V). Hence, the payoff structure of the loan guarantee is identical with that of a
put option, where the promised payment B corresponds to the exercise price, and the
value of the firm's assets V  corresponds to the common stock's price.
Merton (1977) applies this model to a bank for which the debt issue corresponds to
deposits. Because most deposits are of the demand type, the model assumption of term-
debt issue is not strictly applicable. However, if one interprets the length of time until
maturity as the length until the next audit of the bank's assets, then from the point of view
of the guarantor, deposits can be treated as if they were term and interest bearing. Two
5more assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that deposits equal total bank debt and
that both principal and interest are insured. The insured deposits will be riskless and their
current value can be written as  D = B exp(-rT)  . Second, it is assumed that the bank's
asset values follow geometric Brownian motion.
dlnV, =,udt+o1W,  (1)
where  V is the value of assets, p  is the instantaneous expected return on assets, a  is
instantaneous expected standard deviation of assets returns, and W indicates a standard
Wiener process. The Black-Scholes option-pricing  model can be used to value the deposit
insurance per unit of deposits
g=D(af';Yt-h,)-  )  ' 8 S  (-ht),  (2)
D
where  h =-  ,  g is the value of the deposit insurance guarantee
per dollar of insured deposits,  P is the cumulative normal distribution function, T is the
time until maturity of the debt, t is time, D is the face value of the debt, and 5  is the
(annualized) dividend yield (annual dividend payment per dollar of equity).
In order to implement the model, the two unobservable variables, the bank's  asset
value V and the volatility parameter a,  have to be estimated. Ronn and Verma (1986)
suggest using two restrictions for the identification of  these two unknowns. The first
restriction is  obtained by  viewing the equity  value of  the  bank,  which  is  directly
observable, as a call option on the bank's assets with a strike price equal to the value of
the bank's debt
Et = V,D(d,)-DD(d,  - aWY)  (3)
611-V f(T  -t)
where d, =2  Ronn and Verma (1986) model equity as being dividend
protected and therefore dividends do not appear in the previous equation. The Black-
Scholes formula thus defines a one-to-one mapping between the unknown asset value and
the observed equity value.
The relationship between the equity and asset volatility, which can be obtained by




0 E  is the standard deviation of equity retums. The derivation of equation (4) can
be found in the Appendix.
Since the market value of equity is observable and the equity volatility can be
estimated, two nonlinear restrictions are now in place  for identifying two unknowns.
Using data on total debt (deposits), bank equity, and equity volatility, equations (3) and
(4) can be solved simultaneously for V  and cJ. Given these values, equation (2) is used to
solve for the value of deposit insurance per dollar of deposits, which we interpret as the
gross safety net subsidy. In order for this approach to be valid, the time until maturity, T,
of the put  and call options must be the same. Ronn and Verma (1986) use Merton's
(1977) assumption that the time until maturity of the debt is equal to the time until the
next audit. They interpret the strike price of the put option to be equal to total debt of the
bank instead of total deposits only. This assumes that all the debts of the bank are insured
and that they are issued at the risk-free interest rate.
From equations (2)-(4) it follows that the  implicit  safety net  subsidies can be
expressed as a function of only three known variables: the equity volatility, the ratio of
equity to  deposits,  and  the  dividend yield.  Table  1  in  the  Appendix  presents  this
relationship for a range of equity volatility and equity-to-deposits  values.
Duan (1994) shows that Ronn and Verma's  (1986) method is problematic from a
statistical point of view, since they estimate instantaneous equity volatility by the sample
standard deviation of daily equity retums. This estimator is, however, not  efficient and
7imposes equity volatility to be constant. Such an assumption is inconsistent with the
assumption of Merton's (1977) theoretical model that equity volatility is stochastic.
Duan (1994) has developed a maximum likelihood framework to estimate the value
of the deposit insurance which is  consistent with the assumption of Merton's  (1977)
theoretical model that equity volatility is stochastic. By the process in (1), the one-period
transition density of the unobserved values of the bank's  assets can be characterized by
ln(V,+,  / V )  N(p,o- 2) . Therefore, the log-likelihood function for a sample of unobserved
V,  can be expressed as:
2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Lv (V,,  a  l(27a)  af2  InV)-  t=  1, ..., n.  (5)
Since the  call-option  formula (3)  is  an  element-by-element transformation  from  an
unobserved sample of asset values to an observed time series of equity values, we can
write the log-likelihood function for the observed sample of equity values as:
n-1  In  (o  >  1
L(E,,t,,u,o)  =--ln(2ora2)-  2J 2iij  ll  )-Iln(QD(d,)),  (6)
with  t  = 1,  ...,n,  and  where  V,(cr)is the  unique  solution  to  (3)  for  any  c,  and
d, corresponds to d, with V,  (a) in place of V,. In the above expression, we have used the
fact that aE, I a Vt =  CD(d,  ).
With the log-likelihood function in (6), an iterative optimization routine can be
used to compute the maximum likelihood estimates. Given starting values for ,u and  a
and data on equity values E, and debt D,, equation (3) can be solved to yield a series of
bank asset values V,. Equation (6) is then used to solve for  Ai and  v.  This process is
iterated to find the maximum likelihood estimates of ,A and 6,  and their standard errors.
Using the put option formula for deposit insurance (2), one can solve for the value of the
guarantee per dollar of deposits and its standard error. Although from a theoretical point
of view, the maximum likelihood method as developed in Duan (1994) and in Duan and
8Yu (1999) has  some adyantages,, this  method is  extremely difficult to  implement in
practice, because it requires a lot of computation time,  especially for a  large set  of
observations 3, and because it requires high-frequency data on deposits, which is generally
not available. Extrapolation of the end-year observations of the level of deposits to get
high-frequency data on deposits would definitely lead to a poor estimate of C&.
Although Duan (1994) correctly points out that the sample standard deviation of
stock returns is not an efficient estimator for instantaneous equity volatility, rejecting
Ronn and Verma (1986)'s method for this reason seems too strong. It is well-known that
the variance of a time series can be accurately estimated over a relatively short time
interval  by  using  high-frequency  data.  An  estimate  for  equity  variance,  which
theoretically should be the equity variance at a single point in time, is therefore unlikely
to be much affected by estimating it using a discrete interval of time,  as long as the
leverage of  the  bank  has  not  changed drastically over  the  estimation interval. The
advantage of  the Ronn and  Verma (1986) method is  that  it  does not  require high-
frequency data on deposits, but only year-end observations. For the above reasons we
decide to  use the theoretically less prudent, but widely applied method developed by
Ronn and Verna  (1986) to compute the gross safety net subsidies.
The gross subsidy is calculated as if all deposits are fully insured. Many countries,
however, do not have an explicit deposit insurance scheme in place in which every bank
pays a certain premium to a deposit insurance fund. Nevertheless many governments are
expected to guarantee depositor's funds, i.e. there is so-called implicit deposit insurance.
In a banking system with an implicit deposit insurance scheme, the value of the deposit
insurance put option can be seen as a subsidy provided by the government to the bank
which fully accrues to  the welfare of the depositors. Most explicit deposit insurance
schemes provide partial insurance by insuring deposits up to a certain level for which the
bank pays a (usually fixed) fee to the deposit insurance fund. If the premium paid by the
bank is lower than the gross subsidy, deposit insurance will be underpriced.
We make the assumption that the next audit of the bank will take place in one year,
and that the maturity of the debt equals one year as well (T=1). We thus model deposit
3 We have  implemented  both  Ronn  and  Verma's  (1986)  and Duan's (1994)  method  to a subset  of our
sample  of banks.  While  our  program  based  upon  Ronn  and  Verma's (1986)  method  provides  an estimate  of
the gross  safety  net subsidy  in a number  of seconds,  convergence  of our  program  based  upon Duan's
(1994)  method  could  take several  hours  for a single  observation.
9insurance as a limited term (one-year) contract. Since  it is likely that the government will
give the bank  some  forbearance after it  finds  out that  the bank  is undercapitalized
modeling deposit insurance as a one year contract seems to be  restrictive. Pennacchi
(1987) allows for unlimited term contracts and shows that the assumption of a limited
term contract can underestimate the cost of insurance.
It is clear that the cost of insurance should have been higher if the audit indicates
that a bank is undercapitalized and the government decides to give the bank some time
instead of forcing it to immediately increase its capital ratio. Since the level of regulatory
control is unknown ex ante we prefer to  model deposit insurance as  a  limited term
contract,  acknowledging  that  our  annual  gross  safety  net  subsidies  might  be
underestimated. As long as a possible underestimation is similar across banks our method
remains valid for comparative purposes. Moreover it is likely that regulatory control is
weaker in countries with weak banks, so that we would underestimate the gross safety net
subsidies of the most risky banks. Any comparative results we find using a limited term
contract would thus probably have been even stronger had we modeled deposit insurance
in a multi-period environment.
We estimate annual equity volatility by using a sample of daily equity returns. We
exclude  an  observation  if  during  that  day  it  is  announced that  the  bank  will  be
restructured, merged or closed down, since such announcements tend to  lead to  large
jumps in share prices, that have a distortionary effect on the accuracy of the estimated
volatility of equity returns. As a second correction we standardize our estimate of annual
equity volatility across countries by converting each sample period to 252 days, since the
number of trading days is different across countries. After these two corrections, our
estimate of equity volatility o-E  can be written as follows
FE  5ET2  i  (7)
aE iT  aE,Ts 
where T is the actual number of trading days minus those trading days on which large
jumps occurred, and  cE,T  is the bank's equity volatility based upon T trading days.
103. Data
We have selected our sample of countries and banks as follows. We want to include a
number of Asian countries to see whether the gross safety net subsidies are different
between countries that have been heavily affected by the East Asian financial crisis of
1997 and countries that have not. As a second control group we include a number of
highly developed Western countries, which are expected to provide us a benchmark for a
low degree of risk taking. To assess the impacts of the crisis we need data for the crisis
years 1997-98 as well as for some years before the crisis. Within each country we restrict
our sample to the number of exchange listed banks, since we need data on bank market
capitalization and dividend yields.
We  have  collected  data  on  daily  stock  market  capitalization  and  annualized
dividend yields from Datastream. Total deposits at year end, net loans at year end and
ownership data are taken from BankScope. For missing observations we have consulted
Bloomberg.  Ownership  data  is  collected  as  follows.  We  distinguish  between  four
concentrated  ownership  forms.  State-owned  (the  state,  treasury,  military  or  other
government-institution owns shares in the bank), family-owned (a family or individual
owns shares in the bank), company-owned (a manufacturing company owns shares in the
bank),  and owned by another financial institution (another financial institution owns
shares in the bank). Banks that have no concentrated owners (dispersed ownership) are
classified as being widely held. We define a number of ownership dummnies  that are
related  to  the  above  classification of  ownership  and  that  are based  upon  different
thresholds of shareholdings. Our threshold for a majority shareholding is 50% of shares,
and our threshold for a major shareholding is 20% of shares.
We have also collected country-specific data. GDP per capita figures and inflation
rates are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). As a proxy for the quality and enforcement of the legal system of a country
we have collected figures from the Law and Order index of the International Country
Risk Guide  (ICRG), published by  Political Risk  Service. The Law  and  Order index
ranges from 0 to 6, with a higher figures indicating a higher quality or less risk. Law and
Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points.
The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal
11system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the
law. Data on bank concentration and foreign bank penetration are taken from the World
Bank Financial Structure Database. Finally, we have taken data from Demirgui,-Kunt and
Huizinga  (1999) on  the  features of the  deposit  insurance scheme of  a  country, in
particular whether insurance is implicit or explicit and how large the explicit insurance
premiums are.
Our data set includes listed banks from 12 countries, namely the four East Asian
crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), four other countries in
South  East Asia  (Hong Kong, Japan,  Singapore, and  Taiwan), and  the  four major
Western countries to provide for a benchmark (France, Germany, UK and US). Across
these 12 countries we have collected data on 137 listed banks during the period 1991-98.
The banks in our sample include most of the major listed banks in the country 4. The
features of the deposit insurance schemes of the 12 countries are presented in Table 2 of
the Appendix.
To limit the large number of listed banks in Japan, we only look at the long-term
credit banks (3 in total), the city banks (9 in total), and the trust banks (7 in total), thereby
excluding the mostly smaller regional banks (127 in total). To limit the large number of
listed banks in the US, we only include the 22 largest US banks, namely the multinational
banks (6 in total) and the super regional banks (16 in total) as defined by Goldman Sachs.
For the 137 banks we have collected a total of 917 observations across eight years.
Data is missing for  179 observations for a number of reasons. Some banks have not
reported accounting data for each year, some banks only listed at a certain point in the
sample period, and some banks were de-listed during the sample period, because of
government intervention or merger activity. 5 Missing observations for the year 1998 are
4 The distribution  of the number  of banks  across  countries  is as follows  (with  the number  of banks  between
brackets):  France  (4), Germany  (8), Hong  Kong  (12),  Indonesia  (8), Japan  (19), Korea  (22), Malaysia  (10),
Singapore  (5),  Taiwan  (8),  Thailand  (12),  United  Kingdom  (7),  US (22).
5 In Indonesia,  Bank Tiara  Asia,  a private  foreign  exchange  bank,  was taken  over  in 1998  by the Indonesian
Bank  Restructuring  Agency  and  is therefore  missing  for 1998.  Although  Indonesian  Bank Danamon
merged  with state-owned  bank PDCFI  in 1998,  both  banks  continued  reporting  separately  for another  year,
so that  we could  include  Bank  Danamon's  1998  data. For Japan,  two  long-term  credit  banks  have  been  de-
listed  - Long  Term  Credit  Bank  on October  26h, 1998  and  Nippon  Credit  Bank  on December  14th,  1998  -
and  have  been  nationalized.  Since  both  banks  did report 1998  deposit  data,  we were able to include  the
1998  data of those  two  banks  as well. For Malaysia,  we did not  include  Kwong  Yik  Bank,  because  this
bank was  acquired  by RHB  Capital  and officially  de-listed  on August  26h, 1997. For Korea,  we exclude
Commercial  Bank of Korea  and  Korea  Long  Term  Credit  Bank,  because  they  were not listed,  and
Donghwa  Bank,  because  it only  started  to operate  in 1996.  The  sample  of Korean  banks  changes  in 1998
12largely due to bank restructuring that took place after the East Asian financial crisis of
1997.
4. Safety Net Subsidies
We have calculated annual gross safety net subsidies as one-year put options on the value
of bank assets for the 137 banks for each of the years between 1991-98 using Ronn and
Verma's (1986) method. For all the countries in our sample we find that the gross safety
net subsidy is increasing over the time period from an average of 2 basis points (bp) per
annum in  1991 to 216 bp per annum in  1998, and, more specifically, that the average
subsidy is higher during the crisis period 1997-98 than during the pre-crisis years (see
Appendix, Table 3.a).
Over the sample period, the gross safety net subsidy (averaged across all banks in
the  country and  over  all  years)  is  highest  for the  four East  Asian  crisis  countries
Indonesia (154 bp), Thailand (136 bp), Korea (37 bp) and Malaysia (26 bp), and for Hong
Kong (38 bp). The high subsidy of Hong Kong might be explained by contagion effects.
The subsidy (averaged across all banks in the country and over all years) is lowest for the
four highly developed Western countries Germany (0.18 bp), US (0.4 bp), UK (1.3 bp),
and France (2.4 bp), and for Taiwan (1.3 bp). Taiwan's financial system is predominantly
state-owned and banks are highly protected, which might be an explanation for our result
that  suggests that  Taiwanese banks  take  low  risks. The calculated  subsidies of  the
remaining Asian countries Singapore (6 bp) and Japan (12 bp)  are somewhere in the
middle (see Appendix, Table 3.b, for further details).
The subsidies indicate that risk-taking is different among ownership forms. The
gross subsidies across the different ownership forms are (in decreasing order of risk and
due  to merger  activity.  Commercial  Bank  of Korea  and  Hanil  Bank  merged  in 1998  creating  a new bank
called  Hanvit  Bank,  while Hana  Bank  announced  on September  8'h,  1998  to merge  with  Boram  Bank (to
become  effective  in 1999).  Korea  First  Bank  has  been  sold to New  Bridge  Capital  of the US as of
December  30e, 1998,  although  trading  was not suspended  until  June 25 , 1999,  and Kookmin  Bank
announced  a merger  with  Korea  Long  Term  Credit  Bank  on August  25"', 1998.  Accounting  data for Seoul
Bank  continued  to be reported  until 1998,  although  the bank  was nationalized  in 1998,  and  subsequently
sold to HSBC  Bank  on February  22nd,  1999.  In Thailand,  due to lack of data,  we exclude  Laem  Thong
Bank,  Nakornthon  Bank,  and  Union  Bank  of Bangkok.  For 1998,  we also do not have  data on Bangkok
Bank  of Commerce,  which  was  closed  and  de-listed  in 1998,  and  on First Bangkok  City  Bank,  which  was
acquired  by the government  in February  of 1998  and  merged  with  state-owned  Krung  Thai  Bank in 1999.
13with safety net subsidy averaged over all banks in the country and over all years between
brackets): family (128 bp), company (91 bp), other financial institution (57 bp), state (36
bp),  and  widely (15  bp).  These figures  indicate that  concentrated  ownership  links
between banks and other parties, such as in the Japanese keiretsu or the Korean chaebol,
increase risk-taking by banks, and that dispersed ownership of banks is to be preferred.
The impact of state-ownership on risk-taking of a bank is found to be of an intermediate
level (see Appendix, Table 3.c). Note  that not all countries have banks with  all four
different ownership forms. In Western countries, for example, most banks  are widely
held. On the other extreme, in Indonesia most banks have concentrated ownership. In our
sample, 32% of Indonesian banks have an owner that holds at least 20% of shares.
5. Empirical Analysis
In  the previous  section we  have  quickly interpreted the  summary statistics  of  the
calculated gross safety net subsidies. Although those summary statistics show some clear
patterns, we will conduct in this section a more accurate analysis of the differences of
subsidies across countries, periods, and ownership forms using econometric techniques to
control for bank-specific effects. We transform the variables with the logarithm operator.
Calculated gross safety net subsidies, for example, are transformed as follows:  isubsidy =
In(l+subsidy), where subsidy is the gross safety net subsidy in basis points of total debt
calculated using the Ronn and Verma (1986) method. With Isubsidy as the dependent
variable we estimate a series of OLS regression models. Our results will be presented
with White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors.
5.1 Ownership, Size and Credit Growth
First, we regress the level of the gross safety net subsidies on a dispersed ownership
dummy, country dummies and year dummies. The dispersed ownership dummy takes
value one if no shareholder owns more than 5% of shares in the bank, and zero otherwise.
The country dummies will control for differences in institutional environments across
countries.  We  take  the  US  and  year  1991  as  benchmark  variables  to  prevent
nulticollinearity. Table 4.a in the Appendix presents the results. We find that for the
14period 1991-98 gross safety net subsidies to banks in France, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and UK were higher on average than to banks
in the US. Notably, it are the banks in the crisis countries Indonesia (9.3 bp higher than
US), Thailand (5.6 bp higher), Korea (4.4 bp higher), Malaysia (1.9 bp higher) and Hong
Kong (1.9 bp higher) that received the highest gross subsidies, compared to the US (on
average across all banks in the country and over all years). We also find that for the
period 1991-98 gross safety net subsidies were high in 1992 (0.5 bp higher than 1991),
and especially in 1997 (4.1 bp higher) and 1998 (15.7 bp higher), compared to 1991 (on
average across all banks). This result is expected because 1997 and  1998 are the East
Asian crisis years. Controlling for country and time effects, we  find that widely held
banks are less risky (received 0.2 bp less gross subsidy than banks with concentrated
ownership). We find similar results if we use a dispersed ownership dummy that takes
value one if no shareholder owns more than 20% of shares in the bank (instead of 5%),
and zero otherwise.
To  control  for  bank-specific  size  effects  we  add  the  amount  of  net  loans
outstanding as of year-end as a variable to the above model. The results are presented in
Table 4.b of the Appendix, and are similar to the previous model. In addition we find that
gross safety net subsidies are higher for small banks (in terms of loan size). Since it
follows from the above that gross safety net subsidies were highest for the crisis-ridden
East Asian countries, we also estimate the model with country dummies for Indonesia,
Korea,  Malaysia  and  Thailand  only.  We  find  that  gross  safety  net  subsidies  are
significantly higher for these four countries than for the other  eight countries in  the
sample (see Appendix, Table 4.c).
For robustness we repeat the previous analysis while excluding the crisis years
1997-98 from the analysis. The results are quite similar, and can be found in Table 4.d-e
of the Appendix. Again, we find that widely held and large banks received a significantly
lower amount of gross safety net subsidies, i.e. are less risky, and that  the banks in
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea and Malaysia received significantly more gross subsidies than
other countries. In addition, we find that gross subsidies were lower in 1996 than in 1991.
We also estimate a model that controls for another bank-specific effect, namely
loan growth. The results can be found in Table 4.f of the Appendix. In addition to the
above results, we find that banks with high loan growth received large gross subsidies.
15This  finding is  as expected since credit  growth has been excessive in  a  number of
countries, in particular in the East Asian countries, where it has often been the result of
excessive risk-taking.
Secondly, we  regress the level  of gross  subsidy on the  different  concentrated
ownership categories to  see  if  there is  a  difference between  them.  We include  the
ownership dummy variables with absolute majority shareholdings, i.e. larger than 50%
and the ownership variables with major shareholdings, i.e. between 20 and 50%. For the
whole sample period, 1991-98, we find that the gross safety net subsidies to banks with
majority shareholdings by companies and other financial institutions are higher. These
banks might have more access to the safety net not only because they are more risky, but
also because they might have better connections. In addition, we find that small banks
receive more  subsidy from the  safety net.  (see  Table  5.a-b  of  the  Appendix). For
robustness check, we also exclude the crisis years. For the years 1991-96 we again find
that majority shareholdings by companies and other financial institutions increases risk,
and that small banks are less risky. In addition, we find that majority shareholdings by
families increases risk, although to a smaller extent than for companies or other financial
institutions (see Table 5.c-d of the Appendix). In all of the above models we do not find a
significant  difference  in  gross  subsidies  between  dispersed  ownership  and  state
ownership of banks. For robustness, we have carried out the same regressions without the
dummy variables that  indicate absolute majority shareholdings, hence  only with  the
majority shareholdings dummy variables. The results  obtained  are  similar.  Majority
ownership by  companies and  other financial institutions, and  to  a  lesser  degree by
families, increases the risks of banks compared to widely held/dispersed ownership.
To check whether gross safety net subsidies extended to banks in  1996 indicated
which countries were at risk of a banking crisis in 1997 we carry out two regressions for
1996 observations only - one regression excluding loan size and one regression including
loan size. Both regressions include country and ownership dummies. We find for both
regressions that gross subsidies were expected to be higher in 1997 than in 1996 for the
following three  countries:  Indonesia, Korea  and  Thailand  (see  Table  5.e-f  of  the
Appendix).  Except  for  Malaysia,  these  are  indeed  the  East  Asian  countries  that
experienced banking crisis one year later, i.e. in 1997. Hence, we find that implicit gross
safety net subsidies had some forecasting power with respect to the East Asian banking
16crisis. The calculated gross subsidies for the year 1996 indicate relatively excessive risks
in the Indonesian, Thai and Korean banking systems, while we  fail to  find  such an
indication for the Malaysian banking system. Again, we find that concentrated ownership
by companies, other financial institutions and families/individuals increases risk.
We also compare gross safety net subsidies of banks that are affiliated to a business
group and of banks that are not. Since a bank that is affiliated to a business group might
be prepared to support a group member that faces financial distress to a larger degree and
for a longer period, we expect that the gross safety net subsidies to group affiliated banks
is higher than to banks that are not linked to a business group. We classify a bank to be
group affiliated if the bank is either a subsidiary of a diversified business group, or if a
non-financial company holds more than 50% of the bank's shares. We regress the level of
gross safety net subsidies on loan size and on a dumnmy  variable that takes value one if
the  bank  is  group-affiliated and  zero otherwise. We  also  include  country  and  year
dummies. We estimate this regression model both for the whole sample period and for
the  pre-crisis period  1991-96. For  both  periods  we  find  that  group-affiliated banks
received significantly larger gross safety net subsidies, which suggests that those banks
might have supported some member companies of their group (see Table 6.a-b of the
Appendix for the results).
5.2 Macroeconomic Fundamentals, Legal System, Deposit Insurance, and Market
Structure
Thus far we have used country dunmmies  to control for differences across countries. In
this section we expand our model with country-specific variables. Firstly, we control for
differences in two macroeconomic fundamentals: the level of GDP per capita and the
level of inflation. It is expected that banking systems are less risky in countries with high
GDP per capita and low rates of inflation. We indeed find this to be the case for our
sample when we regress the level of extended gross safety net subsidies on a constant,
year dummies, a dispersed ownership dummy, the size of extended credit, GDP per capita
and inflation. We also find again that widely held banks are less risky (see Table 7.a of
the Appendix).
17Secondly, we control for differences in the quality and enforcement of laws across
countries. It  is expected that banking systems are riskier in countries with poor legal
systems. We indeed find this to be the case for our sample when we regress the level of
gross safety net subsidies on a constant, year dummies, a dispersed ownership dummy,
the size of extended credit, and a law and order index. We also find again that widely
held and large banks are less risky (see Table 7.b of the Appendix).
Thirdly,  we  compare  the  impact of  explicit versus implicit  deposit  insurance
schemes.  Seven  countries of  our  sample  of  12 countries  have  an  explicit  deposit
insurance scheme in place. The other five countries have implicit insurance schemes. To
assess the difference between explicit and implicit insurance we regress the level of gross
safety net subsidies on a constant, year dummies, a dispersed ownership dummy, the size
of extended credit, and a dummy variable that takes value one if  the country has an
explicit deposit insurance scheme, and find that banks are less risky if they operate in a
country that has an explicit deposit insurance scheme. We also find again that widely
held and large banks are less risky (see Table 7.c of the Appendix).
For the countries with explicit schemes, deposit insurance premiums range from
0.015% to 0.3 % of insured deposits. The actually charged deposit insurance premiums
and calculated gross subsidies can be found in Table 8 of the Appendix. For two out of
seven countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes (namely Japan and Korea) we
fmd that the actually charged deposit insurance premiums are lower than the average
gross  subsidies over  the period  1991-98. The net  subsidies, however,  do  not  differ
statistically from  zero at any  reasonable level  of significance. We can therefore not
conclude for countries in our sample with explicit deposit insurance schemes that the
actually charged deposit insurance premiums were inadequate, although many banks in
our sample could have been charged higher premiums to reflect their risks.
We also look at the combined effect of the type of deposit insurance scheme and
the quality of the legal system. Also when we add both variables we find that banks are
less risky if they operate in a country with an explicit deposit insurance scheme and/or a
sound legal system (see Table 7.d of the Appendix).
In our sample, countries with explicit insurance are mostly highly developed. Since
the existence of explicit insurance and the existence of a good institutional enviromment
are highly correlated in our sample, our finding might as well indicate that the existence
18of a good institutional environment reduces the risk of a banking system. We therefore
cannot conclude that the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme reduces the
risk of a banking system. This would not contradict Demirgu,c-Kunt and Detragiache
(1999) who provide empirical evidence that explicit deposit insurance increases banking
system vulnerability in countries with weak institutional environments.
Finally we look at the effect of the market structure of a country's banking sector
on the level of the safety net subsidy. In particular we look at the concentration of the
banking market and the foreign bank penetration. We measure concentration by the share
of  the  three  largest banks'  assets in  total  banking  sector assets,  and  foreign bank
penetration by the share of foreign bank assets in total banking sector assets. When we
add these two variables to  the model that controls for differences in the quality and
enforcement of laws across countries we find that the gross safety net subsidy is higher
for banks in countries with low bank concentration and/or low foreign bank penetration
(see Table 7.e-f of the Appendix).
5.3 Forecasting Bank Distress
In section 5.1 we found that implicit gross safety net subsidies rightly indicated banking
problems in three out of the four East Asian countries that experienced a banking crisis in
1997. In  this section we will explore the ex  ante  power of  implicit gross  safety net
subsidies to  forecast bank  distress. The year  1998 was characterized by government
intervention in banks across the East Asian region (see Table 9 of the Appendix). We will
analyze the link between bank intervention and the level of gross safety net subsidies
before 1998 for our sample of banks to assess the forecasting power of the our method to
forecast bank problems.
Firstly, we analyze whether gross safety net subsidies are indeed higher for banks
that are intervened. We regress the level of gross subsidies in 1998 on the level of gross
subsidies in  1997 and  add a  dummy variable that  indicates whether the  bank  was
intervened. As  a  second  regression we  add  a  country dummy  for  Indonesia which
experienced a dramatic increase in gross subsidies between 1997 and 1998 due to the
severity of the crisis. As expected, in both cases we find that gross safety net premiums
are higher for intervened banks (see Table 10 of the Appendix).
19We expect that banks that receive high gross safety net subsidies have a higher
chance to fail, because they take higher risks. To assess the power to forecast bank failure
we regress estimate a Probit model with a dummy variable taking value one of the bank is
intervened in  1998 as dependent variable and the level of gross safety net subsidy in
either 1996 or 1997 as dependent variable. Governments of some East Asian countries
intervened more heavily into their banking sectors than others in  1998. Malaysia, for
example,  allowed  banks  to  continue  to  operate  even  though  many  banks  were
undercapitalized. On the other hand, all Thai banks have been intervened in  1998. To
control for differences in the level of intervention we add country dummies to the Probit
model. We do not include a country dummy for Thailand, since all Thai banks have been
intervened, and for countries were no banks have been intervened during 1998. We find
that banks with high levels of gross safety net subsidies in either 1996 or  1997 had a
higher chance  to  fail  and/or be  intervened in  1998 than banks  with  low  levels of
subsidies. In addition to Thailand, we also find that Indonesia and Korea intervened more
heavily in banks than other countries (see Table 11 of the Appendix). These results are
supportive of our claim that our method of calculating implicit gross safety net subsidies
has some power in assessing the risks of banks and in forecasting bank distress.
6. Conclusions
We have applied  Ronn and Verma's  (1986) technique to  calculate gross  safety net
subsidies for a large number of banks in different countries, in particular in South-East
Asia. We have argued that a relatively high gross safety net subsidy is an indication that
the bank takes excessive risks. We can, therefore, use gross safety net subsidies to assess
the relationship between risk taking behavior of banks and their governance structure. For
many banks, we find that deposit insurance has been subsidized by governments during
the  90s,  especially  for  East  Asian  banks.  The  subsidy  is  largest  for  banks  with
concentrated private ownership, especially for banks that are predominantly owned by
either a single company or another financial institution, and to a lesser extent by a single
family or individual. Banks with dispersed ownership, on the other hand, are found to
engage into a relatively low degree of risk-taking, while state-owned banks are average
performers. Banks with concentrated private ownership might have more access to the
20safety net not only because they are more risky, but also because they might have better
connections. We also find that gross safety net subsidies are higher for banks that are
affiliated to a business group, that are small and/or have high credit growth, and for banks
in countries with low levels of GDP per capita, high inflation rates, poor quality and
enforcement of laws, low bank concentration, and/or low foreign bank penetration. Our
findings support the view that existing governmental deposit insurance schemes do not
work properly, because they create moral hazard  for banks,  and  suggests that  these
incentive problems differ in magnitude between different types of banks, in particular
between banks that differ in govemance structure. Finally, we find that measuring bank
risk taking by calculating gross safety net subsidies has some power in predicting bank
failures.
Our findings suggest that a bank's  risk-taking depends to  a large extent on its
institutional environment and its corporate govemance structure. Banks that operate in an
environment with  weak  institutions  and  are  characterized by  concentrated  private
ownership tend to take high risks. An important finding is that government-owned banks
take fewer risks than banks with concentrated private ownership. Although many authors
favor private ownership of banks for reasons of economic efficiency (see, for example,
La Porta et al., 2000), this result suggests that government-ownership of banks may be
less  detrimental  to  the  stability  of  the  financial  system  in  countries  with  an
underdeveloped financial system. The ultimate goal, however,  should be  a  financial
system  with  dispersed  private  ownership  of  banks  where  both  shareholders  and
depositors are protected by proper enforcement of prudent regulation.
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23Appendix
Derivation  of the Relationship  between  Equity  and  Asset  Volatility
The price of the bank's equity Et as a call depends on the value of the bank's assets VJ
Et = E(V,,t)  (Al)
Applying Ito's Lemma to (Al) gives
dE  = "Et dV  + aEt dt + 1 a2E  t a2dt  (A2)
Since the last two terms are deterministic, we have
dE  I  aV- 1 dV
Var  E  t  Var-  (A3)
Equation (A3) describes the relationship between the variance of the instantaneous return
on equity Var  Et  and the variance of the instantaneous return on assets  Var  Vt.
E  VI
Let  aR  =  Var(jt  )  and a2 = Va {V-). Then the relationship  between equity and
asset volatility can be described as
VEIam
aE=  a  'J  (A4)
Applying  a  Black  and  Scholes  (1973)  framework  Merton  (1977)  shows  that
_  KVt)+  a2(T  -t)
=(D(d,)  with dt  .We  thus find that av,  T  t
E  E(A5)
Vt(D(d,)
which is equation (4) in the text.
24Tabie 1 -Annual Implicit Safety Net Subsidies  as a Percentage of Deposits
\<7E  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  loo
EID
5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.17  0.37  0.66  1.24
10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.13  0.30  0.65  1.22  2.06
20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.19  0.47  1.01  1.89  3.13
30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.0]  0.06  0.22  0.56  1.20  2.22  3.68
40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.06  0.23  0.61  1.31  2.43  4.05
50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.22  0.61  1.34  2.50  4.18
Notes: aE  is annual volatility of equity returns (standard deviation of equity returns) in %. EID is the ratio of market
value of the bank's equity to the value of the bank's deposits in %.  The dividend yield is assumed to be zero.
25Table 2 -Deposit  Insurance System Features
Country  Type  Date Established  Insurance Premium
France  Explicit  1980  Callable,  but limited
Germany  Explicit  1966  0.03  % of deposits
Hong  Kong  Implicit  - -
Indonesia  Implicit  - -
Japan  Explicit  1971  0.084  % of insured  deposits
Korea  Explicit  1996  0.02  % of insured  deposits
Malaysia  Implicit  -
Singapore  Implicit  - -
Taiwan  Explicit  1985  0.015  % of insured  deposits
Thailand  Implicit  -
UK  Explicit  1982  0.3 % of insured  deposits  (maximum)
US  Explicit  1934  0.24  % of insured  deposits
Notes:  For  the sample  of countries  we list  whether  the country  has an explicit  or an implicit  deposit  insurance  scheme.
If the country  has an explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  then  we  report  the date  when  it was  established  and  the level  of
the annual  insurance  premium.  Korea  had  implicit  deposit  insurance  before  1996.  The  data  is taken  from  Demirgiiu-
Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1999),  Table  I.
26Table  3 - Gross  Safety  Net Subsidies
(3a)  (3b)  (3c)
Across years  Across countries  Across ownership
Year  Subsidy  Country  Subsidy  Owner20  Subsidy
1991  2.1179  France  2.3670  Company  91.043
(4.80)  (5.00)  (305)
[71]  [29]  (99]
1992  3.9334  Gennany  0.1808  Family  127.96
(6.08)  (0.51)  (612)
[87]  [54]  [67]
1993  1.0434  Hong  Kong  37.857  Other  Fl  57.192
(3.18)  (98.7)  (159)
[114]  [79]  [67]
1994  1.0731  Indonesia  154.37  State  35.666
(2.47)  (413)  (161)
[124]  [55]  [63]
1995  1.4389  Japan  12.434  Widely  15.104
(5.20)  (69.9)  (74.1)
[131]  [149]  [625]
1996  0.7982  Korea  36.582
(2.39)  (89.1)
[131]  [125]
1997  37.076  Malaysia  25.848
(74.4)  (81.9)
[136]  [60]















Average  35.544  Average  35.544  Average  35.544
(210)  (210)  (210)
[917]  [917]  [917]
Notes: Column  (3a) reports  gross subsidies  across  years with the subsidies  averaged  over all banks and across all
countries.  Colufm  (3b) reports  gross  subsidies  for each country  with the subsidies  averaged  over  all banks and across
all years.  Column  (3c) reports  gross  subsidies  across  ownership  forms  with  the subsidies  averaged  over all banks and
across  all years.  The variable  Owner20 is identical  to "Company"  if a company  owns more  than 20% of the shares,
"Family"  if a family  owns  more  than  20% of the shares,  "OtherFI"  if another  fnancial institution  owns more  than 20%
of the shares,  "State"  if a govermnent  institution  owns  more  than 20% of the shares, and "Widely"  if no concentrated
group  owns  more  than 20% of the shares.  Gross  subsidies  are reported  in basis  points  (bp) of total  bank debt Standard
deviations  of average  subsidies  are between  round brackets.  The  number  of banks in each category  is between  square
brackets.
27Table 4 - Explaining gross subsidies by dispersed ownership, country  and year  effects
(4a)  (4b)  (4c)  (4d)  (4e)  (4f)
France  0.459***  0.591***  - 0.039  0.135  0.005
(0.141)  (0.147)  (0.082)  (0.090)  (0.062)
Germany  0.092  0.204  - -0.183***  -0.095  -0.134**
(0.147)  (0.156)  (0.054)  (0.061)  (0.054)
Hong Kong  1.054***  0.734***  - 0.077  -0.092  0.072
(0.171)  (0.177)  (0.069)  (0.081)  (0.066)
Indonesia  2.336***  1.826***  1.565***  1.240***  0.985***  1.206***
(0.216)  (0.229)  (0.204)  (0.190)  (0.197)  (0.200)
Japan  0.990***  1.235***  0.302***  0.475***  0.448***
(0.111)  (0.121)  (0.057)  (0.071)  (0.067)
Korea  1.680***  1.383***  1.053***  0.659***  0.497***  0.659***
(0.121)  (0.130)  (0.104)  (0.066)  (0.075)  (0.072)
Malaysia  1.061***  0.616***  0.306**  0.249*  0.026  0.127
(0.168)  (0.186)  (0.151)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.134)
Singapore  0.207  -0.052  - -0.240***  -0.373***  -0.245***
(0.158)  (0.165)  (0.063)  (0.074)  (0.067)
Taiwan  0.365*  0.187  - 0.435***  0.354***  0.281***
(0.207)  (0.209)  (0.117)  (0.074)  (0.104)
Thailand  1.884***  1.646***  1.228***  0.679***  0.569***  0.606***
(0.181)  (0.182)  (0.154)  (0.106)  (0.104)  (0.108)
UK  0.310**  0.470***  0.059  0.162***  0.075
(0.138)  (0.139)  (0.057)  (0.065)  (0.062)
1992  0.410***  0.413***  0.387***  0.442***  0.434***  0.585***
(0.138)  (0.141)  (0.144)  (0.124)  (0.127)  (0.125)
1993  -0.063  -0.046  -0.176  -0.154  -0.138  -0.002
(0.133)  (0.133)  (0.122)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.101)
1994  -0.039  0.000  -0.143  -0.122  -0.093  0.016
(0.129)  (0.129)  (0.114)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.102)
1995  -0.064  -0.011  -0.152  -0.139  -0.103  0.041
(0.123)  (0.123)  (0.112)  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.092)
1996  -0.196  -0.116  -0.279***  -0.274***  -0.222**  -0.085
(0.121)  (0.122)  (0.106)  (0.094)  (0.095)  (0.089)
1997  1.626***  1.676***  1.522***  - - -
(0.157)  (0.157)  (0.162)
1998  2.815***  2.876***  2.734***  - -
(0.189)  (0.189)  (0.193)
Widely5  -0.182**  -0.160**  -0.257  ***  -0.150***  -0.130***  -0.127**
(0.083)  (0.081)  (0.076)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)
Lloan  - -0.165***  -0.068***  - -0.096***
(0.030)  (0.024)  (0.023)
LDloan  - - - - - 0.386**
(0.161)
R2  0.625  0.635  0.585  0.385  0.394  0.398
Obs  917  911  911  658  653  556
Notes: Dependent variable is In(l+Subsidy), where Subsidy is the gross safety net subsidy in basis points (bp) of total
debt calculated using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986). Widely5 is a dummy variable that takes value 1, if no
shareholder owns more than 5% of shares in the bank, and 0 otherwise. Lloan is ln(Loan), where Loan is the amount of
net loans outstanding at year-end. LDloan is In(l+Dloan), where Dloan is the growth of net loans during the year. A
constant term was added, but is not reported. The US provides the benchmark for the country effects, and year 1991 for
the year effects. In addition to country and year effects, model (4a) only controls for dispersed ownership. Model (4b)
includes net loans to control for size effect. Model (4c) only includes country dummies for the East Asian crisis
countries. Models (4d) and (4e) are identical to models (4a) and (4b) respectively, but are estimated using pre-crisis
years only. Model (4f) controls for credit growth. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *
indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significant at 10% level.
28Table 5 - Explaining gross subsidies by majority ownership, country and year effects
(5a)  (5b)  (Sc)  (5d)  (5e)  (50
LLoan  - -0.150***  --  -0.081***  - -0.040
(0.031)  (0.023)  (0.332)
State20  0.258  0.246  0.252  0.244  0.156  0.148
(0.244)  (0.247)  (0.156)  (0.158)  (0.128)  (0.127)
State50  -0.111  -0.001  -0.029  0.165  0.349  0.362
(0.314)  (0.316)  (0.156)  (0.153)  (0.228)  (0.228)
OfherF15  - - --  - -0.024  -0.112
(0.081)  (0.077)
OtherFI1O  - - --  - 0.034  0.037
(0.131)  (0.133)
OtherFI20  0.275  0.249  0.198  0.181  0.543  0.520
(0.177)  (0.179)  (0 181)  (0.181)  (0.435)  (0.442)
OtherFI50  0.743***  0.636***  0.256**  0.222**  0.494***  0.461  *
(0.251)  (0.251)  (0.113)  (0.110)  (0.247)  (0.252)
Family5  - - --  - 0.589*  0.558*
(0.300)  (0.290)
FamilylO  - - - - 0.854***  0.846***
(0.264)  (0.261)
Family2O  -0.219  -0.259  0.119  0.096  0.026  0.004
(0.238)  (0.236)  (0.159)  (0.157)  (0.315)  (0.311)
Family5O  0.479  0.311  0.629*  0.534'  -0.239  -0.295
(0.495.)  (0.496)  (0.062)  (0.338)  (0.264)  (0.264)
Company5  - - - - 0.362**  0.348*
(0.180)  (0.180)
Companyl  O  - - - - 0.456  0.409
(0.310)  (0.315)
Company20  0.070  0.063  -0.102  -0.115  0.335  0.311
(0.169)  (0.168)  (0.159)  (0.158)  (0.273)  (0.278)
CompanyS0  0.981***  0.843***  0.664***  0.589***  0.841***  0.796**
(0.248)  (0.248)  (0.120)  (0.200)  (0.316)  (0.335)
Indonesia  - - - - 1.248***  1.159***
(0.382)  (0.387)
Korea  - - - - 0.545***  0.481***
(0.135)  (0.140)
Thailand  - - - - 0.587***  0.554***
(0.263)  (0.263)
R'  0.638  0.645  0.409  0,414  0.672  0.676
Obs  917  911  658  653  131  131
Notes:  Dependent  variable  is In(l+Subsidy),  where  Subsidy  is the gross  subsidy  in basis points  of total debt calculated
using  the method  of Ronn  and Verma  (1986).  Lloan  is the logarithm  of net loans  outstanding  at year-end.  State5  is a
dunmmy  variable  that takes  value  I if the state owns  5-10%  of the shares  in the bank.  Sirnilarly,  StatelO  indicates  10-
20% state ownership,  State20 indicates  20-50%  state ownership,  and State50 indicates  50-100%  state ownership.
Family5  is a dunmny  variable  that  takes  value  I if a family  owns  5-10%  of the shares  in the bank.  Similarly,  Familyl0
indicates  10-20%  family  ownership,  Family20  indicates  20-50%  family  ownership,  and Family50  indicates  50-100%
family  ownership.  OtherFI5  is a durmmy  variable  that takes  value I if another  financial  institution  owns 5-10%  of the
shares in the bank. Similarly,  OtherFIIO  indicates  10-20%  ownership  by another  financial institution,  OtherFI20
indicates  20-50%  ownership  by another  financial  institution,  and OtherFi50  indicates  50-100%  ownership  by another
financial  institution.  Company5  is a dummny  variable  that takes  value  I if a company.  owns  5-10%  of the shares  in the
bank. Similarly, CompanylO  indicates 10-20% company ownership, Company20 indicates 20-50% company
ownership,  and Company50  indicates  50-100%  company  ownership.  For models (5a)-(5d)  a constant  term, country
dunmmies  and year dummies  were added,  but are not  reported.  The  US  provides  the benchmark  for the country  effects,
and year 1991 for the year effects.  In addition  to country  and year effects,  model (5a) only controls for majority
ownership  effects.  Model  (5b)  includes  net loans  to control  for  size  effect.  Models  (5c)  and (5d)  are identical  to models
(5a) and (5b)  respectively,  but are estimated  using  years 1991-96  only.  Models  (5e)  and (5f) include  1996  observations
only. For  models  (5e) and (5f) a constant  term was  added,  but is not reported,  and only significant  country  effects  are
reported.  In addition  to country  effects,  model (Se)  only controls  for majority  ownership  effects.  Model  (5f) includes
net loans  to control  for size  effect.  The ownership  dummies  State5  and StatelO  are dropped,  because  they contain  no
values  one. Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  are in parentheses.  *** indicates  significance  at 1% level;  **
indicates  significance  at 5% level;  * indicates  significance  at 10%  level;  1  indicates  significance  at 11%  level.
29Table 6 - Explaining  gross subsidies  by group affiliation,  country and year effects
(6a)  (6b)
LLoan  -0.156***  -0.088
(0.031)  (0.023)
Group  0.642***  0.543***
(0.233)  (0.  190)
R2  0.638  0.403
Obs  911  653
Notes: Dependent  variable  is ln(l+Subsidy),  where  Subsidy is the gross  subsidy  in basis  points of total  debt calculated
using  the method  of Ronn  and Verma  (1986).  Lloan is the logarithm  of net loans outstanding  at year-end.  Group is a
dunmmy  variable  that takes  value  I if the bank is affiliated  to a group,  and 0 otherwise.  We classify  a bank  to be group-
affiliated  if the bank is either  a subsidiary  of a diversified  business  group,  or if a non-financial  company  holds  more
than  50% of the bank's shares.  For  both  model  (6a) and (6b)  a constant  term,  country  dummies  and year  durmmies  were
added,  but are not reported.  The  US  provides  the benchmark  for  the country  effects,  and year 1991  for the year  effects.
In addition  to country  and  year effects,  both  models  include  net loans  to control  for  size  effects.  Model  (6a) is estimated
for the full sample  period.  Model  (6b) is estimated  using  pre-crisis  years 1991-96  only. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard  errors  are in parentheses.  *** indicates  significance  at 1% level; ** indicates  significance  at 5% level; *
indicates  significance  at 10%  level.
30Table 7 -Explaining subsidies  by macroeconomic,  institutional and competition variables
(7a)  (7b)  (7c)  (7d)  (7e)  (7f)  (7g)
Widely5  -0.126*  -0.253***  -0.269***  -0.154*  -0.248***  -0.177**  -0.249***
(0.077)  (0.078)  ((.089)  (0.087)  (0.073)  (0.076)  (0.081)
LLoan  -0.023  -0.113***  -0.189***  -0.082  -0.108***  -0.114***  -0.101l**
(0.027)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.029)  (0.030)
LGDPcap  -0.370***  - -_  -_
(0.050)
Llnfl  0.401***  - --  -
(0.086)
LLaworder  - -2.179***  --  -2.192***  -1.622***  -1.249***  -0.979**
(0.364)  (0.363)  (0.409)  (0.444)  (0.450)
Explicit  - - -0.249**  -0.264**  -0.320***  -0.396***  -0.555***
(0.116)  (0.116)  (0.109)  (0.113)  (0.132)
LConc  - - -0.492***  - -0.294***
(0.081)  (0.101)
LForeign  - - --  - - -0.190***  -0.139***
(0.032)  (0.039)
R2 0.568  0.530  0.504  0.533  0.439  0.392  0.399
Obs  911  911  911  911  775  661  661
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(l+Subsidy), where Subsidy is the gross safety net subsidy in basis points of total debt
calculated using the method of Ronn and Verma (1986). Lloan is the logarithm of the amount of net loans outstanding
at year-end.  LGDPcap is the logarithm of the level  of GDP  per  capita. Linfl is ln(l+Infl), where Infi  is the inflation rate
based  upon the CPI of the country.  Llaworder is the logarithm  of the Law and Order index of the Political  Risk
Services  group which ranges  from 0 to 6 (6 indicating  an excellent  system  of law and order).  Explicit is a dumnmy
variable  that  takes  value  I if the country  has explicit  deposit  insurance,  and 0 otherwise.  LConc is the logarithm  of the
ratio of the three  largest  banks' assets  to total  banking  assets.  LForeign is the logarithm  of the share of foreign  bank
assets  in total  banking  sector  assets.  A constant  term and year dunmmies  were added,  but are not reported.  Year 1991
provides  the benchmark  for the year effects.  In addition  to year effects,  model  (7a) controls  for dispersed  ownership,
loan  size, GDP  per capita,  and inflation  effects.  Model  (7b)  controls  for dispersed  ownership,  loan size  and quality  of
legal  system  effects.  Model  (7c) controls  for dispersed  ownership  and loan size  effects,  and for  the existence  of explicit
deposit  insurance.  Model  (7d) combines  models  (7b) and (7c) by controlling  for dispersed  ownership,  loan size, and
quality  of legal system  effects,  and for the existence  of explicit  deposit  insurance.  Models  (7a)-(7d)  use data for the
years 1991-98.  Models  (7e)-(7g)  use data for the years 1991-97,  since  no competition  data is available  for the year
1998.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors are in parentheses.  ***  indicates  significance  at  1% level; **
indicates  significance  at 5%  level; * indicates  significance  at 10%  level.
31Table 8 - Gross Subsidies and Actually Charged Deposit Insurance Premiums
Country  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Average  Actually  Charged
France  1.745  1.050  0.009  0.074 0.125  0.006  1.354  13.5  2.37  Callable
(2.24)  (1.61) (7e-3) (0.10) (0.07) (6e-3)  (1.81) (5.16) (4.98)
Germany  0.009  5e-6  4e-5  0.193 0.002  0.001  0.62  0.79  0.18  3.0
(0.01) (9e-6) (8e-5) (0.43) (5e-3) (3e-3) (0.85) (1.08) (0.51)
Japan  0.122 4.783  1.154 0.088  0.926  0.025  24.9  65.8  12.43  8.4
(0.20)  (3.38) (1.69) (0.23) (0.96) (0.06) (31.9) (188)  (70.0)
Korea  0.374  4.18  0.438  2.37  1.70  1.46  44.8  228  36.6  2.0
(0.27)  (2.48) (0.31) (1.96) (1.39) (2.39) (27.7) (149)  (89.1)
Taiwan  6.574  0.392  1.865  1.582  0.148  0.100  0.518  0.504  1.337  1.5
(3.06)  (0.42) (1.29) (1.32) (0.20) (0.10) (0.55) (0.37) (2.22)
UK  0.592  2.06  0.026  0.125  0.014  0.004  0.383  6.84  1.34  30.0
(0.42) (2.32) (0.04) (0.19) (0.03) (0.01) (0.27) (7.15) (3.56)
us  0.030  0.001  0.084  0.003  0.020  0.004  0.084  2.22  0.404  2.4
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.17) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.16) (2.93) (1.44)
Notes:  For  countries  with  explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes  the table reports  the means  of gross  safety  net subsidies
(with  standard  deviations  between  brackets)  and  the actually  charged  insurance  premiums  (all in  basis  points  of total
bank debt).  The  actually  charged  insurance  premiums  are from  Dernirgtl9-Kunt  and Huizinga  (1999),  Table  1.  Note that
Korea  had implicit  deposit  insurance  before  the year 1996.
32Table  9 - Bank  Intervention  in 1998
Country  Name  of Intervened  Banks
Indonesia  Bank  Bali,  Bank  Danarnon,  Bank  International  Indonesia  (BII),  Bank  Lippo,  Bank  Niaga,
Bank  Tiara  Asia
Japan  Long  Tern Credit  Bank,  Nippon  Credit  Bank
Korea  Cho  Hung  Bank,  Chung  Chong  Bank,  Dae  Dong  Bank,  Dong  Nam Bank,  Hana  Bank,  Hanil
Bank,  Housing  and Commercial  Bank,  Kooknnin  Bank,  Koram  Bank,  Korea  First  Bank,
Kyungki  Bank,  Seoul  Bank,  Shinhan  Bank
Malaysia  AMMB  Holdings,  RHB  Capital
Thailand  Bangkok  Bank,  Bangkok  Bank  of Commerce,  Bangkok  Metropolitan  Bank,  Bank  of Asia,
Bank  of Ayudhya,  First Bangkok  City Bank,  Krung  Thai Bank,  Siam  City Bank,
Siarn  Cormmercial  Bank,  Union  Bank  of Bangkok,  Thai  Danu  Bank,  Thai  Farmners  Bank,
Thai  Military  Bank
Notes:  Bank  intervention  includes  closure,  re-capitalization,  nationalization,  sale  to foreigners  and domestic  takeovers
of banks.  Only  banks  within  our sample  are included  in  the above  list. Source:  World  Bank.
33Table 10 - Gross Subsidies  and Intervened Banks
(lOa)  (lOb)
Subsidy(-1)  1.439*  1.327*
(0.094)  (0.821)
Intervention  571.7***  478.6***
(165.6)  (167.5)
Indonesia  - 626.4***
(238.2)
Constant  35.0**  24.3*
(17.6)  (14.1)
R2  0.288  0.357
Obs  122  122
Notes:  Dependent  variable  is the gross  safety  net subsidy  in basis  points  of total  debt  calculated  using  the method  of
Ronn  and  Verma  (1986)  for  the year 1998.  Subsidy(-I)  is the gross  safety  net subsidy  in basis  points  of total  debt for
the year 1997.  Intervention  is a dummy  variable  that  takes  value  one if the bank  is intervened  in 1998,  and  zero
otherwise.  Intervened  can  be closed,  re-capitalized,  nationalized,  sold  to foreigners,  or merged  with  another  local
financial  institution.  In model  (lOb)  we add  a country  dummy  for  Indonesia.  We estimate  both  models  using  OLS.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  are  in parentheses.  *"  indicates  significance  at 1%  level;  **  indicates
significance  at 5% level;  * indicates  significance  at 10%  level.
Table 11- Predicting Banking  Distress
(I la)  (I lb)
Subsidy  0.177**  0.0048***
(0.094)  (0.0015)
Indonesia  0.793  1.644***
(0.659)  (0.518)
Japan  -1.622  -0.089
(0.427)  (0.436)
Korea  1.001***  1.438***
(0.352)  (0.330)
Malaysia  0.310  0.470
(0.498)  (0.512)
Constant  -1.094***  -1.31  1***
(0.183)  (0.212)
Pseudo-R 2 0.189  0.255
Obs  131  136
Notes:  Dependent  variable  is a dummy  variable  that  takes  value  one if the bank  is intervened  in 1998,  and zero
otherwise.  Intervened  can  be closed,  re-capitalized,  nationalized,  sold  to foreigners,  or merged  with another  local
financial  institution.  Subsidy  is the  gross  safety  net subsidy  in basis  points  of total  debt calculated  using  the method  of
Ronn  and Verma  (1986).  We  have  added  country  dummies  for  Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea  and Malaysia.  We  estimate  a
Probit  model.  Model  (I la) uses  gross  subsidy  data  for  the year 1996  and intervention  data  for  the year 1998.  Model
(I lb) uses gross  subsidy  data  for  the year 1997  and intervention  data  for  the year 1998.  *** indicates  significance  at
1%  level;  ** indicates  significance  at 5%  level;  * indicates  significance  at 10%  level.
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